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Epstein: Limits of Inevitable Discovery

NOTE
LIMITS OF THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE IN UNITED
STATES V. YOUNG:
THE
INTERSECTION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY GUARDS, HOTEL GUESTS
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Young, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit confronted the question of whether a violation
of a hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures can be ignored if the
evidence obtained during the commission of the violation would
have been inevitably discovered by the police by lawful means.1
In Young, private hotel security officers invited a police officer to
observe their search of a guest’s hotel room and personal effects,2
some of which the police officer ultimately seized as evidence of
the hotel guest’s suspected criminal activity.3 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding that this search violated the
hotel guest’s Fourth Amendment right and that, under the
exclusionary rule, the gun discovered during the search should be
suppressed as the tainted fruit of that unlawful search.4
The Ninth Circuit in Young correctly affirmed the district
1

United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711 (9th Cir. 2009).
On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the government did “not dispute the district
court’s conclusion that Hilton security should be considered state actors.” Id. at 717.
3
Id. at 715.
4
Id. at 715, 723.
2
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court’s grant of the motion to suppress the illegally obtained
evidence. However, the court failed to articulate the clear
limitations on the inevitable discovery doctrine. In light of the
strong argument by the dissent in favor of an expansion of the
inevitable discovery doctrine when private security guards assist
police officers in obtaining evidence that would otherwise be off
limits, Young may have unintentionally set the stage for a
significant curtailment of Fourth Amendment protections.
This Note analyzes the Young court’s opinion and the
potential consequences of the majority’s cursory rejection of the
government’s inevitable discovery argument. This Note also
reconciles the differing applications of the inevitable discovery
doctrine by the Young majority and dissent and highlights the
speculative nature of employing the inevitable discovery doctrine
based on the facts of Young. Part I of this Note presents the
background of the case and the historical development of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the inevitable discovery
doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams.5
Part II outlines the Young decision and analyzes Young’s
expectation of privacy in comparison with other cases involving
similar facts and the inevitable discovery doctrine. Part II also
discusses the dissent’s vigorous, but misguided, argument in favor
of applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to Young’s case. Part
III discusses the potential consequences of the majority’s cursory
examination of the inevitable discovery doctrine and presents a
more in-depth analysis of why the inevitable discovery doctrine
does not apply in this case.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the evening of August 5, 2007, James Johnson, a guest at
the downtown San Francisco Hilton Hotel, reported to hotel staff
that a laptop computer, an iPod, and other items were missing
from his hotel room, Room 13572.6 Hilton Hotel’s Assistant
Director of Security & Safety, Officer Dirk J. Carr (Hilton Officer
Carr), reviewed a lock interrogation report7 and found that a copy
5

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
Young, 573 F.3d at 713-14.
7
A lock interrogation report is generated by a software system called Saflok.
Declaration of William Marweg in Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 2, United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
6
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of the key to Room 13572 had also been inadvertently registered
to hotel guest Michael Young by hotel front desk personnel.8
Suspecting Young’s involvement in the theft of Johnson’s personal
belongings, Hilton Officer Carr called Young in his hotel room,
Room 13575, to ask whether he had accessed Room 13572, to
which Young replied “no.”9
A few hours later, at roughly 8:30 p.m., Hilton Officer Carr and
Hilton Hotel Security Officer Roger Hicks (Hilton Officer Hicks)
went up to Rooms 13572 and 13575 to investigate the missing
items and the room discrepancy.10 They found Room 13572 to be
completely vacant.11 In Room 13575, the room registered to
Young, the private security officers found an empty key card
packet on the bed with Room Number 13572 written on it.12 Hilton
Officers Carr and Hicks found two backpacks in the room: one
under the bed and another in the closet.13 They opened the
backpack in the closet and found a gun in the zipped front pocket,
in addition to credit cards and checkbooks in other names.14
Hilton’s written security policy required that “[i]n the event a team
member in the course of his/her duties observes or finds a
weapon in a guest room . . . [s]ecurity shall E-key15 the guest room
without disturbing the weapon and leave a note on the door for the
guest to call Security upon returning to the room.”16 When the
hotel guest returns to his or her room and finds a note on the door
indicating the electronic lockout, he or she “is to be informed that
Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 4, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Marweg Decl.]. Saflok allows Hilton security to determine the
activity of hotel keys and door locks by running a lock interrogation report. Id. This system
also facilitates the electronic lockout of a hotel room, which can be accessed only by a
special electronic lockout key issued only to Hilton’s security staff. Id.
8
Report of Hilton Security Officer Dirk Carr, Ex. D, Notice of Motion and Motion to
Suppress Fruits of Unlawful Search and Seizure; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion to Suppress, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Carr Report].
9
Id.
10
Declaration of Dirk Carr in Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 1, United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 6, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Carr Decl.].
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.; Carr Report, supra note 8, at ¶ 4.
14
Carr Decl., supra note 10, at ¶ 6.
15
“E-key” refers to the practice of placing a hotel room on electronic lockout. See
Marweg Decl., supra note 7, at ¶ 4.
16
Hilton Hotels Corp. Standard Practice Instructions, Tab A, Marweg Decl. § 4(A)
[hereinafter Hilton SPI].
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company policy prohibits possession of weapons on company
and/or hotel property and offered a secured location on company
or hotel property, if available, for the storage of such weapon until
the time of his/her departure.”17 Hilton Officers Carr and Hicks
placed Room 13575 on electronic lockout but failed to leave a
note directing Young to the front desk for advisement of the policy
and proper storage of his weapon.18
That same night, when Young returned to his hotel room at
approximately 11:48 p.m., he was denied entry by his electronic
key card.19 Likely believing his card had been inadvertently
deactivated, Young went to the front desk to remedy his access
problem,20 only to be seated in the lobby as hotel security
summoned local San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) Officer
Koniaris.21 There are no facts indicating that Young believed he
had been evicted or that Hilton intended to evict him from his hotel
room. Hilton Officer Hicks, who contacted Hilton’s Director of
Security, Bill Marweg (Hilton Director Marweg), after being
informed of Young’s return, radioed SFPD Officer Koniaris and
requested that he come inside.22 Hilton Officer Hicks told SFPD
Officer Koniaris that he believed that Young had stolen items from
another hotel guest.23 SFPD Officer Koniaris asked Young for his
name and his driver’s license.24 Young then asked if his

17

Id. § 4(A)(9).
See Carr Declaration, supra note 10, at ¶ 7; Affidavit of Michael Hamilton, Ex. B,
Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Fruits of Unlawful Search and Seizure;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress § 5, United States
v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2007).
19
Marweg Decl., supra note 7, at ¶ 14.
20
Judge Goodwin, who wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Young,
hypothesized that “Young might reasonably have believed his key to be defective or
demagnetized, rather than suspecting that he had been evicted from the room.” United
States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 2009).
21
Report of Hilton Security Officer Roger Hicks, Ex. C, Notice of Motion and Motion
to Suppress Fruits of Unlawful Search and Seizure; Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Motion to Suppress, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Hicks Report]; Declaration of Officer Michael P. Koniaris in
Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 4,
United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 3, United
States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Koniaris
Decl.].
22
Declaration of Roger Hicks in Support of United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Exclude Evidence, Ex. 3, United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress Fruits of Search at ¶ 6, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Hicks Decl.].
23
Id.
24
Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 4.
18
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companion could leave, to which Officer Koniaris replied that he
could after Hilton Security Officer Hicks verified that the individual
had just arrived at the hotel with Young and was otherwise
uninvolved.25
SFPD Officer Koniaris exited the hotel and conducted a
“warrants and identification” check, which indicated that Young
had been arrested for felonies and misdemeanors in the past.26
SFPD Officer Koniaris returned to the lobby and engaged Young
in twenty to thirty minutes of conversation on topics such as family
matters and Young’s felonious past and prison sentences, while
awaiting further instructions from Hilton Officer Hicks.27 Hilton
Officer Hicks then informed SFPD Officer Koniaris that a gun had
been found in Young’s room, at which point SFPD Officer Koniaris
and various Hilton security staff took Young to the Hilton security
office, searched him for weapons, and handcuffed him to a
bench.28 SFPD Officer Koniaris then called his sergeant to advise
him of the situation and was instructed that he “could not enter
Young’s hotel room” without a search warrant, “but that Hilton
security staff could enter a guest’s hotel room” without
authorization from a magistrate.29 Hilton Officer Hicks, joined by
Hilton Officer Carr, asked SFPD Officer Koniaris to accompany
them upstairs to Room 13575.30 The two private security officers
entered the room, leaving the door open to allow SFPD Officer
Koniaris to observe their activities inside the room.31
Once inside Room 13575, and while still visible to SFPD
Officer Koniaris, Hilton Officer Hicks removed a backpack from the
hotel room’s closet and placed it on the bed.32 Hilton Officer Hicks
then unzipped the front pocket of the backpack to reveal a gun.33
Upon viewing the gun, SFPD Officer Koniaris entered the room
and took possession of the backpack containing the gun.34 SFPD
Officer Koniaris returned to the Hilton security office and arrested
25

Id.
Id.
27
Id. The court noted that “[a]t no time did Officer Koniaris read Young his Miranda
rights or indicate to him that he was a suspect.” United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 715
(9th Cir. 2009). The court, however, failed to identify, analyze and dispose of the Miranda
issue in this case, and its decision on that issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
28
Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 6.
29
Id. at ¶ 7.
30
Hicks Decl., supra note 22, at ¶ 7, Young, 573 F.3d 711.
31
See id.; Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 8.
32
Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 9; Young, 573 F.3d at 715.
33
Koniaris Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 9.
34
Id. ¶ 10.
26

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 4

336

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Young based on his belief that Young was a felon in possession of
a gun.35
Before trial, Young moved to suppress the evidence obtained
that night by SFPD Officer Koniaris, alleging that his Fourth
Amendment right was violated by the officer’s unconstitutional
search and seizure of his possessions without a warrant.36 District
The government
Judge White granted Young’s motion.37
appealed, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Young
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room
and that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to the
search of Young’s hotel room and the seizure of his personal
belongings.38
B.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE INEVITABLE
DISCOVERY DOCTRINE
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.39

The privacy protections granted by the Fourth Amendment
extend to an individual who maintains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his or her person, effects, abode, or hotel room.40 This
expectation of privacy must not only be subjectively held by the
individual but must also be “one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”41
The exclusionary rule, a court-created doctrine that prohibits
the admission at a criminal trial of evidence obtained as a result of
an illegal search or seizure,42 serves to deter police misconduct,43
35

Id. ¶ 12. About two months after Young’s arrest at the hotel, the government
determined that Young had used a stolen credit card to reserve his room, though that fact
neither supports nor detracts from the court’s analysis on this issue. Young, 573 F.3d at
715. This fact could affect the court’s analysis of Young’s expectation of privacy, but the
hotel was unaware of this fact at the time the gun was discovered.
36
Young, 573 F.3d at 715.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 723.
39
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40
United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95 (1990)).
41
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990).
42
Although there has been recent dicta that the exclusionary rule is not
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to protect individual rights, and to preserve judicial integrity.44 The
rule was first applied in Weeks v. United States,45 where the
United States Supreme Court reasoned:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.46

In consideration of the tension between citizens’ constitutional
rights and the judiciary’s role in achieving justice, the Supreme
Court has created a variety of exceptions to the exclusionary
rule.47 One such exception, at issue in Young, is the inevitable
automatically invoked as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure (see Herring v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698-700 (2009); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
591 (2006) (stating that “[s]uppression of evidence, however, has always been [this Court’s]
last resort, not our first impulse”)), that specific issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
43
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700. At the core of the current debate over the exclusionary
rule is whether the only purpose of the rule is to deter police misconduct. See id. (stating
that “the exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it results in
appreciable deterrence” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984))). But see
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the exclusionary rule
protects individuals’ fundamental rights and maintains judicial integrity). The United States
Supreme Court majority currently maintains that the rule serves only the deterrence
purpose, but this particular exploration is beyond the scope of this Note.
44
See, e.g., United States v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986) (explaining that
exclusionary rules are “aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution”);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (reasoning on the basis of judicial integrity that
“[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or
worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 223 (1960) (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) (holding that a
conviction resting on illegally obtained evidence cannot stand without making the courts
themselves accomplices to “willful disobedience” of law)); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 394 (1914) (implying that to sanction by judicial decision unconstitutional searches
and seizures would be to affirm an “open defiance” of the prohibitions enumerated by the
Constitution); People v. Navarro, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 164, 170 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (stating
that the exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police misconduct”); State v. Childress, 666
P.2d 941, 942 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (describing exclusionary rule as “designed not only to
deter unlawful police conduct, but also to protect individual rights”).
45
Weeks, 232 U.S. 383.
46
Id. at 393.
47
See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009) (explaining that the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule where officers rely on a facially valid search warrant
will allow the admission of evidence if either the warrant issued was supported by probable
cause, or it was not, but the officers executing it reasonably believed that it was); Murray v.
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (discussing the independent source doctrine,
which holds evidence admissible if the prosecution can show that illegally acquired
evidence was also acquired from a source independent of the initial illegality); Nardone v.
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discovery doctrine.
The inevitable discovery doctrine, which is closely related to
the harmless-error doctrine,48 permits illegally obtained evidence
to be admitted in a criminal trial if “the evidence in question would
inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police
error or misconduct.”49 The seminal case on the doctrine of
inevitable discovery, Nix v. Williams, involved a man arraigned in
the kidnapping and suspected murder of a ten-year-old girl.50 The
defendant, Williams, had surrendered to the police after a warrant
was issued for his arrest.51 While two police officers escorted
Williams from Davenport, Iowa, to Des Moines in a patrol car, the
young girl was still missing, and two hundred law enforcement
officers and private citizens had been deployed in the area to find
her body.52 During the car ride, one of the officers began
speaking to Williams despite a promise both officers gave to
Williams’s attorney that they would not engage Williams in
conversation.53 This discussion resulted in Williams’s eventual
agreement to direct the officers to the location of the young girl’s
body.54
Nix v. Williams is notably one of the few cases to make it to
the United States Supreme Court twice for review.55 On the first
appeal, the Court suppressed evidence of Williams’s statements
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (holding that, under the attenuation doctrine,
evidence obtained illegally can be introduced where the connection between the illegality
and the evidence “may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint”).
48
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967), set out the rationale behind the
harmless-error rule as follows:
All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago
through its Congress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be
reversed for “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.” 28 U. S. C. § 2111. None of these rules on its face distinguishes between
federal constitutional errors and errors of state law or federal statutes and rules. All
of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block
setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood
of having changed the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed
harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.
Id. (footnote omitted).
49
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984).
50
Id. at 434-36.
51
Id. at 435.
52
Id. at 435, 448.
53
Id. at 435.
54
Nix, 467 U.S. at 436.
55
See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Nix, 467 U.S. at 431.
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on the ground that the police had violated Williams’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.56 On remand,57 the prosecution
presented no evidence of Williams’s statements, but relied instead
on evidence of the condition of the girl’s body and clothing and on
the results of postmortem medical and chemical tests on the
body.58 On his second appeal, Williams contended that evidence
of the body’s location and condition was “fruit of the poisonous
tree”59 taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because Williams’s statements resulted in the discovery by police
of incriminating information that was later used against him at
trial.60 The Supreme Court, however, held that the evidence was
admissible; in so holding, the Court applied the inevitable
discovery doctrine for the first time.61 The Court held that the
unconstitutionally obtained evidence was nevertheless admissible
because the government had shown that the girl’s body “inevitably
would have been found” by search crews.62
The Nix Court explained that the “purpose of the inevitable
discovery rule is to block setting aside convictions that would have
been obtained without police misconduct.”63 The Court reasoned
that if the “prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
56

Brewer, 430 U.S. at 406; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating in pertinent part: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.”).
57
In affirming the appellate court’s holding that Williams had not waived his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and that evidence of his statements was properly suppressed,
the Court stated, “While neither Williams’ incriminating statements themselves nor any
testimony describing his having led the police to the victim’s body can constitutionally be
admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its condition might
well be admissible on the theory that the body would have been discovered in any event,
even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams.” Brewer, 430 U.S. at
406 n.12.
58
Nix, 467 U.S. at 437.
59
The contention, in other words, was that the evidence was a product of the
detective’s unconstitutional questioning. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341
(1939).
60
Nix, 467 U.S. at 440-43.
61
The Supreme Court in Nix had substantial support for its adoption of the inevitable
discovery doctrine from the majority of state and federal courts in the country, and the
doctrine has developed an even more impressive following in the fifteen years since its
inception. See, e.g., United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Fisher, 700 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699,
704 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982); Papp v.
Jago, 656 F.2d 221, 222 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 914
(1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042, 1044 (5th Cir. 1980).
62
Nix, 467 U.S. at 450.
63
Id. at 443-44 n.4.
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been discovered by lawful means – here the volunteers’ search –
then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence
should be received.”64
In supporting its requirement of a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the Court explained that
“inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses
on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment and does not require a departure from the usual
burden of proof at suppression hearings.”65 The “demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification” in Nix that were
sufficient to prove inevitability were the following: the massive
police-led search teams and their deliberate grid-fashion mapping,
their close proximity to the site of the body, the trial court’s finding
that the search team would have resumed and found the body “in
short order,”66 the teams’ strict instructions to search all ditches
and culverts (one of which was where the girl’s body was found),
and the freezing temperatures that the trial court found would
have suspended tissue deterioration.67
The Supreme Court was convinced in Nix that the girl’s body
would have been inevitably discovered by the police force’s lawful
and aggressive search efforts.68 However, the question moving
forward from Nix continues to be about less conclusive factual
scenarios.
Nix’s preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
provided the framework for the Ninth Circuit’s inevitable discovery
doctrine analysis in Young.
II.

THE YOUNG MAJORITY OPINION

A.

YOUNG MAINTAINED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HIS HOTEL ROOM

The Young court’s first step was to consider whether Young
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel
room.69 If he did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his hotel room, no Fourth Amendment protections would extend
to his belongings that were seized as evidence by SFPD Officer
Koniaris. The search would therefore be deemed lawful and the
inquiry would not need to proceed to an analysis of the inevitable
64

Id. at 444.
Id.
66
Id. at 438.
67
Id. passim.
68
Nix, 467 U.S. at 449-50.
69
United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2009).
65
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discovery doctrine.
Under firmly established law, an individual maintains the
same expectation of privacy against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment in a hotel room as that
individual would in his or her home.70
To invoke Fourth
Amendment protection, “a person must . . . demonstrate a
subjective expectation that his activities would be private, and he
must show that his expectation was one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.”71 The Young court first analogized the
facts to those of United States v. Bautista in making this
determination, and found them to preclude application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine.72
In Bautista, the defendant rented a motel room using a stolen
credit card, though that fact was unknown to the motel manager at
the time of check-in.73 When the manager discovered the fraud
after receiving a phone call from the third-party company that
reserved the defendant’s room, she called the local police
department and asked them to “find out what was going on with
[the defendant] and the credit card.”74 If the defendant could not
explain the credit card situation to the manager’s satisfaction, she
was prepared to have him evicted unless he could make
alternative payment arrangements.75 After police officers arrived,
the motel manager gave them a key to the defendant’s room. The
officers knocked on the door and said, “San Diego police. Open
the door.”76 The defendant’s wife opened the door and was
silent.77 The officers asked for and received her consent to search
the room, but the Ninth Circuit found her consent to have been
tainted and consequently ordered the trial court to suppress the
evidence of counterfeit money and related paraphernalia found

70

See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (holding that “[n]o less than a
tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, . . . a guest in a hotel
room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures”);
United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the “Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to one’s
home, but also extends to such places as hotel or motel rooms”).
71
United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States
v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000).
72
See id.
73
Id. at 586-87.
74
Id. at 587.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 591.
77
Id.
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within the room.78
The court of appeals in Bautista held that the search of the
defendant’s motel room and the subsequent seizure of the
counterfeit money and paraphernalia violated the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment right. The Bautista court based its holding on
two points: (1) the defendant’s occupancy had not been lawfully
terminated by management or by the police so as to constitute an
eviction, so the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the hotel room, and (2) because he retained that
reasonable expectation, the search and seizure were
unconstitutional.79 The court found that it was “undisputed in this
case that the motel’s manager took no affirmative steps to
repossess the room once she learned that it had been reserved
with a stolen credit card.”80 The manager never asked the police
to evict the defendant, pursuant to the motel’s “generally lax
practices.”81
In Young, the hotel’s security guards were concerned with
strictly adhering to hotel security policy. Their concern for proper
compliance was indicated by their immediate efforts to contact
Hilton Director Marweg upon discovering the gun in Young’s hotel
room.82
Given that nothing in Hilton’s procedure manual
mandated eviction in the event of a room-key mix-up, there was
nothing in the record to suggest that Hilton intended to evict
Young or that he believed he was being or had been evicted. As
the majority stressed, “Young’s return to his room and attempt to
enter it are evidence Young still believed he was a guest at the
hotel, a reasonable belief given that the hotel had not actually
evicted him or told him that he was evicted.”83 The court cited
additional facts that “militate against a factual finding that Young
had been evicted from his room,” including the following: Young
was never told by Hilton security staff that he had been evicted;
Young’s belongings were never removed from his room; Young
had not been removed from the registered guest list; Hilton
security staff did not contact the police after first discovering the
firearm, but only after Young returned to his room; and at the time
of the warrantless search and seizure, Hilton security staff and

78

Bautista, 362 F.3d at 588, 592.
Id. at 593.
80
Id. at 590.
81
Id. at 590 (citing United States v. Dorais, 241 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)).
82
See United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 2009).
83
Id. at 718.
79
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SFPD Officer Koniaris considered Young to be in possession of
the room, based upon their references to the room as “Young’s
room” and SFPD Officer Koniaris’s statement to Hilton Officer
Hicks that he “could not enter Young’s room to search it.”84
The Young court next distinguished the case from those cited
by the government in support of its appeal: United States v.
Cunag,85 United States v. Allen,86 and United States v.
Jacobsen.87 In Cunag, the Ninth Circuit found that nothing in the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the police’s entry, search and
seizure of the defendant’s hotel room because the hotel took
“justifiable affirmative steps to repossess [his room] and to assert
dominion and control over it when they discovered and confirmed
that [the defendant] had procured occupancy by criminal fraud and
deceit.”88 Cunag involved a defendant who checked into a hotel
room using a deceased woman’s credit card with a forged
governmental identification card and a forged letter authorizing his
use of the credit card.89 The morning after the defendant checked
into the hotel room, the hotel manager was informed that the
defendant’s registration paperwork was “irregular,” and he called
the Department of Motor Vehicles to investigate the suspicious
documentation.90
After conclusively determining that the materials provided by
the defendant to reserve the hotel room were fraudulent, hotel
management locked him out of the hotel room and contacted the
local police department to report the crime.91 When three police
officers arrived at the hotel, the manager discovered that someone
was using the telephone in the hotel room, which was surprising
because the defendant had been locked out of the room.92 The
officers accompanied the hotel manager to the room in question
and, when the defendant opened the door, the police officers
smelled a strong odor of smoke coming from the room and grew
concerned that there was a fire in the designated nonsmoking
hotel room.93 The officers removed the defendant and his
84

Id. at 717.
United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2004).
86
United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997).
87
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
88
Cunag, 386 F.3d at 895.
89
Id. at 889.
90
Id. at 890.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 892.
93
Id. at 890, 895.
85
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companions from the room and detained them in the hallway, then
entered the room and observed a “red hot burner” on the room’s
stove that had been burning tissue, as well as evidence of stolen
mail in plain view of the officers.94 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence, after finding that the hotel’s lockout of the defendant
and the room’s other occupants, in combination with registering a
police report, was “a justifiable ‘affirmative act of repossession by
the lessor’ [that] is the factor that finally obliterates any cognizable
expectation of privacy a lessee might have.”95
The court in Young held that “[u]nlike Bautista, Cunag is
inapplicable to the facts presented here.”96 In Cunag, the
defendant had been conclusively evicted, but in Young, the
electronic lockout was only a temporary measure, as the Hilton
SPI did not require eviction of a guest upon the discovery of a
weapon. Furthermore, at the time of the lockout, Young was not
suspected of a committing a crime, which may have implicated a
different clause of the security manual.97 As the majority in Young
stated, “the intent [of the hotel] apparent to Young critically
distinguishes Cunag from the circumstances before us now.”98
The court held that, unlike the defendant in Cunag, Young
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel
room.99 Additionally, none of the facts suggested that the Hilton
Hotel would have taken affirmative steps to evict Young even if
they had discovered his credit card fraud.100 Young therefore
maintained both a subjective and a reasonably objective
expectation of privacy in his hotel room.101
Similarly, the court distinguished Allen.102 The defendant in
Allen rented a motel room with cash and, at the time of the search
and seizure, his rental period had lapsed and the motel had
retaken possession of the room.103 Upon entering the motel room
94

Cunag, 386 F.3d at 890.
Id. at 895 (citing Dorais, 241 F.3d at 1129).
96
United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 719 (9th Cir. 2009).
97
See id.; see also Hilton SPI, supra note 16, § 4(D) (stating that “[i]f the
circumstances surrounding a found or observed weapon suggest[] the potential for unlawful
activity, the local police are to be informed by the Director of Safety and Security or the
General Manager”).
98
Young, 573 F.3d 711, 719 (9th Cir. 2009).
99
Id. at 718-19.
100
Id. at 719.
101
Id. at 720.
102
Id.
103
United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 697 (6th Cir. 1997).
95
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after the rental period lapsed, the motel manager discovered
contraband, which was ultimately seized by the police.104 The
Sixth Circuit held that the motel’s repossession of the room
extinguished the defendant’s expectation of privacy.105 But the
Young majority held that the facts in Allen were distinguishable;
unlike the defendant in Allen, Young did not have a diminished
expectation of privacy, because his rental period had not lapsed
nor had he been evicted from his room.106
The Ninth Circuit also found the Supreme Court’s holding in
United States v. Jacobsen107 inapplicable to the facts of Young.108
Jacobsen involved the search of a Federal Express package
initially opened and searched by private employees, and the
ultimate seizure of contraband contained within the package by
Drug Enforcement Agency officers.109 The Supreme Court held
that “the package could no longer support any expectation of
privacy,” in part because it “contained contraband and little
else.”110
The Young court agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning in United States v. Allen111 that applying Jacobsen to
searches of private residences would “make the government the
undeserving recipient of considerable private information of a
home’s contents,” and distinguished the facts of Young from those
of Jacobsen.112
The court reasoned that neither Young’s
backpack nor the hotel room contained “only contraband” and,
therefore his expectation of privacy in his hotel room was not
extinguished.113
Because the Ninth Circuit found that Young had maintained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room, SFPD Officer
Koniaris’s warrantless search of that room and seizure of
evidence from within it violated Young’s Fourth Amendment
right.114 The court concluded that the evidence was therefore
properly suppressed under the exclusionary rule. However, the

104

Id. at 697-98.
Id. at 700.
106
Young, 573 F.3d at 720.
107
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
108
Young, 573 F.3d at 720.
109
See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109.
110
Id. at 120-21.
111
United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 1997).
112
Young, 573 F.3d at 720-21 (citing United States v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1021
n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)).
113
Young, 573 F.3d at 721.
114
Id. at 723.
105
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government argued that the inevitable discovery doctrine applied
and that, pursuant to the doctrine, evidence of the gun was
admissible.115 As discussed below, the appellate court rejected
that argument and affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the
evidence.116
B. THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE WAS INAPPLICABLE TO
ADMIT THE EVIDENCE
The government argued, as an alternative to its argument that
Young lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel
room, that under the inevitable discovery doctrine, the gun would
have been inevitably discovered regardless of police
misconduct.117 It is on this point that the Young majority and
dissent diverged. The majority narrowly disposed of the issue of
inevitable discovery, holding that the government failed to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that Young would never have
been allowed back into his room; because the failure to obtain a
warrant cannot form the basis for inevitability, the court concluded
that inevitable discovery did not apply.118
However, the
government argued, and the dissent maintained, that the record
showed that the gun would have been inevitably discovered.119
What both the majority and the dissent neglected to explicitly
address was whether the government showed by a
preponderance of the evidence that the gun would inevitably have
been discovered by lawful means. Both opinions left open the
possibility that the gun could inevitably have been discovered by
lawful means. As stated in Nix v. Williams, “inevitable discovery
involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment and
does not require a departure from the usual burden of proof at

115

Id. at 721.
See id.
117
See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Fruits of Search
at 14-15, United States v. Young, No. CR-07-0559 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007).
118
Young, 573 F.3d at 721.
119
Id. at 722 (majority opinion) (describing the government’s argument that “once
Young was arrested and immobilized in the hotel security office, the officer then had not
only the right, but the duty, for public safety reasons, to take possession of the firearm,
which he had seen in the course of his earlier search of the room. Once the police had
possession of the firearm, that possession became lawful because it was inevitable”); id. at
727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (stating that “[b]ecause the hotel staff had discovered the gun
before Officer Koniaris commenced his investigation, it was a reasonable certainty that the
police ultimately would have obtained possession of the gun by lawful means”).
116
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suppression hearings.”120 Over time, the speculative approach
adopted by the Young court will make the inevitable discovery
doctrine ripe for a potentially dramatic, and unwelcome,
expansion.
The Young majority explained that, if Hilton’s security staff
had followed the written manual, “it is entirely likely that after some
discussion with hotel security, Young might have decided to store
the firearm, or, alternatively, take his belongings with him and
vacate the room.”121 The Hilton SPI required that hotel security
officers E-key the hotel room containing the weapon, leave a note
on the door for the room’s guest and, upon the guest’s return,
inform him or her of the hotel’s weapon policy and offer a secured
location for storage of the weapon until the guest’s departure.122
Young’s room was E-keyed and, under Hilton’s protocols, he
should have been offered alternative storage options. Instead,
upon returning to his room, Young was unable to access his room,
but he was left with no indication by Hilton personnel of their
reasons for locking him out.123 Young, therefore, was unaware
that he had anything but a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
room and reasonably expected to have his hotel room unlocked
so that he could resume his occupancy. The majority stated that
these facts demonstrated a “warrantless search of a private
residence, not incident to an arrest, by hotel staff working with a
police officer.”124
The government argued that no warrant was necessary
because SFPD Officer Koniaris knew, prior to arresting Young,
that he had been to prison and that the officer therefore had
probable cause to arrest Young based upon the report by hotel
security that Young had a gun in his hotel room.125 The
government continued that, once Young was arrested and
immobilized in the hotel security office, SFPD Officer Koniaris had
a right and a duty to take possession of the firearm.126
The majority pointed out that this circular reasoning failed to
recognize that SFPD Officer Koniaris could have and should
have127 obtained a warrant prior to seizing the gun found in Room
120

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984).
Young, 573 F.3d at 722.
122
Hilton SPI, supra note 16, § 4.
123
Young, 573 F.3d at 717.
124
Id. at 722.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Officer Koniaris’s sergeant even told the officer that he “could not enter Young’s
121
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13575.128 The court cited United States v. Echegoyen129 in
explaining that it “has stated in no uncertain terms that ‘to excuse
the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had
probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant
would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment.’ ”130 For additional support, the court cited United
States v. Mejia131 as authority for the proposition that the Ninth
Circuit had never applied the inevitable discovery doctrine as an
exception to the exclusionary rule so as to excuse the failure to
obtain a warrant where the police had probable cause but simply
did not seek a warrant.132
The majority found that “nothing more than speculation – not
the ‘demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification’
required by Nix – support[s] the discovery of the challenged
evidence outside the improper search by [SFPD] Officer
Koniaris.”133 The court punished SFPD Officer Koniaris’s failure to
obtain a warrant by refusing to apply the inevitable discovery
doctrine, because the doctrine’s application on these facts would
place the police in a better position than if the illegal search had
not occurred.134
C.

THE YOUNG DISSENT

After summarizing the facts of Young, the dissent concluded
that “the record shows that the police ultimately would have
obtained possession of the gun based on the situation as it
existed before SFPD Officer Koniaris unlawfully took the gun out
of the hotel room.”135 The dissent explained that, because the
private security actors had already conducted an independent
search before Young was detained and SFPD Officer Koniaris had

hotel room to search it but that Hilton security staff could enter a guest’s room.” Koniaris
Decl., supra note 21, at ¶ 7.
128
Young, 573 F.3d at 722.
129
United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1986).
130
Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (citing Echegoyen, 799 F.2d at 1280 n.7).
131
United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995).
132
Young, 573 F.3d at 723.
133
Id.
134
Id.; see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 (1984) (explaining that the rationale
behind the exclusionary rule has been to deter police from violating constitutional and
statutory protections and that a way to ensure such protections is to exclude evidence
obtained in violation of these protections; “On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put
in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.”).
135
Young, 573 F.3d at 726 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
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probable cause, “it was a reasonable certainty that the police
ultimately would have obtained possession of the gun by lawful
means.”136 This reasoning is incomplete, however, because the
dissent essentially sidestepped the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment by failing to recognize that the missing link
between a suspect in custody based on probable cause and the
inevitable discovery of evidence by lawful means is a search
warrant.137
Another misstep in the dissent’s analysis was its failure to
explain the “reasonable certainty” of the inevitable discovery of the
gun.138 It was far from certain how the private actors would have
proceeded absent the police misconduct. Given the Hilton
security officers’ heightened concern for compliance with the
Hilton SPI, it is equally likely that they would have required a
warrant before turning the gun over to the police, as suggested by
SFPD Officer Koniaris’s sergeant,139 or would have independently
handled the weapon issue with Young and allowed the police to
investigate the hotel-room theft.
In rejecting the majority’s interpretation of the hotel’s policy
and the district court’s finding that applicability of the inevitable
discovery doctrine would be incompatible with the hotel’s written
policy, the dissent stated that the “hotel’s written policy does not
address the situation where, as here, the guest in possession of a
weapon is a known felon and the lead suspect in an ongoing
criminal investigation taking place at the hotel.” 140 However, the
dissent’s application of the facts was misinformed because the
Hilton security officers were unaware of Young’s criminal history
and they never indicated in their declarations or incident reports
that he was a lead suspect in any investigation they were
conducting.141 The officers were simply responding to a report by
a hotel guest that items were missing from his room, a task that is
“in the course of his/her duties” per the Hilton SPI.142 This
situation was accounted for in Hilton’s SPI and there is no reason
136

Id. at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986).
138
See Young, 573 F.3d at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
139
See id. at 715 (majority opinion) (finding that “Officer Koniaris then called his
sergeant to advise him of the situation. The sergeant informed Officer Koniaris that Officer
Koniaris could not ‘enter Young’s hotel room to search it,’ but the sergeant also told him
that ‘Hilton security staff could enter a guest’s room.’ ”); see also Koniaris Decl., supra note
21, at ¶ 7.
140
Young, 573 F.3d at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
141
See generally Hicks Decl., supra note 22; Marweg Decl., supra note 7.
142
Hilton SPI, supra note 16, § 4(A).
137
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to believe Hilton’s security officers would have departed from its
mandate, absent improper police influence.
The dissent’s analysis is also unsatisfactory because it
conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent that holds “ ‘to excuse the
failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had
probable cause and could have inevitably obtained a warrant
would completely obviate the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.’ ”143 Instead, the dissent seeks to excuse SFPD
Officer Koniaris’s failure to obtain a search warrant by explaining
that, at the moment before the unlawful police misconduct, Young
was already handcuffed and soon to be en route to the police
station for booking.144 However, this would align the facts with
those in United States v. Echegoyen145 or United States v.
Mejia,146 both of which held that the failure to obtain a search
warrant cannot form the basis for the application of the inevitable
discovery doctrine.
The dissent relied heavily on the cooperation of the private
actors involved. This cooperation – or, perhaps more accurately,
acquiescence – must not be confused with predictability. The
result would be an inevitable discovery doctrine that would be
overly applicable to searches conducted by private actors working
in concert with police officers. The majority should have directly
rebutted the dissent so as not to inadvertently help to expand the
inevitable discovery doctrine. The dramatic expansion of the
inevitable discovery doctrine that would result from adopting the
position of the Young dissent would erode Fourth Amendment
protections and diminish the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule.

III. THE YOUNG COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTLY REJECTED THE
GOVERNMENT’S FLAWED INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ARGUMENT,
WHICH UNDERMINES FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Despite the dissent’s troubling reliance on the unwritten
policies of private security organizations, the majority neglected to
analyze in depth the theory set forth in the dissenting opinion:

143

Young, 573 F.3d at 723 (citing United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
144
Id. at 727-28 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
145
United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 (9th Cir. 1986).
146
United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995).
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[A]t the crucial moment before the unlawful entry, Young was a
criminal suspect handcuffed to a chair in the hotel’s security
office. Whether or not Officer Koniaris conducted the unlawful
search of the hotel room, Young’s next destination was the
police station for booking, not back to his hotel room to pack up.
Under the facts of this case, no reasonable sequence of events
would lead to Young retrieving his gun before the police
inevitably obtained it.147

According to the government and the Young dissent, the
opportunity for Young to re-enter his hotel room for his belongings
had lapsed, and the Hilton security officers were not following the
written policy when they recruited the assistance of SFPD Officer
Koniaris.148 As stated by the dissent, the private security officers’
failure to adhere to the written Hilton SPI allowed for weight to be
accorded to Hilton Director Marweg’s testimony that “under such
circumstances, ‘the police must come to the hotel and take
possession of the weapon.’ ”149 The dissent suggested that the
majority and the district court misread the written policies of the
hotel, and that consideration must therefore be given to the hotel’s
unwritten policy.150 This argument is without merit, but the
majority nonetheless should have explored and then dismissed it.
The majority should have explained that, in the absence of a
written policy addressing circumstances like those of this case, the
hotel’s conduct was not sufficiently predictable to support a
reasonably certain conclusion that the police would ultimately
have obtained possession of the gun by lawful means. Finding
otherwise would expand the inevitable discovery doctrine by
allowing a court to engage in speculation regarding the actions of
private security entities. With the increasing prevalence of such
entities and a decreasing distinction between state actors and
private actors, courts run the risk of engaging in inevitable
discovery analyses that may contribute to the gradual erosion of
the constitutional protections established centuries ago against
unreasonable searches and seizures.151 The majority’s holding
147

Young, 573 F.3d at 727-28 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
See id. at 726-27 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
149
Id. at 727 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
150
Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
151
See, e.g., Al Youngs, The Future of Public/Private Partnerships, 73 FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 7 (Jan. 2004) (describing the 1980s and 1990s as the “era of
collaboration and joint ventures between public law enforcement and private security,” as
well as discussing the increase of private as exemplified by corporate security and the
number of gated communities).
148
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that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable here was
proper, but the majority should have engaged in a more complete
analysis of the doctrine and made its narrow applicability under
such circumstances clear.
A.

AN INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ARGUMENT BASED ON PRIVATE
SECURITY POLICIES IS INHERENTLY TOO SPECULATIVE

An inevitable discovery analysis involving the actions of
governmental law enforcers generally incorporates policies and
protocols that are widely known, accepted and anticipated.152
Conversely, an inevitable discovery analysis involving the actions
of private actors involves speculative elements due to the very
nature of their private and unregulated behavior and procedures.
With the increasing privatization of law enforcement and security
services, therefore, comes the decreasing predictability of state
action and the increasing probability that illegally obtained
evidence will be admissible under the inevitable discovery
doctrine.153
The Young majority held that the government had not met its
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
Young would never have been allowed back into his room
because, even “assuming that staff had followed the written policy
when Young returned to the room, it is entirely likely that after
some discussion with hotel security, Young might have decided to
store the firearm, or, alternatively, take his belongings with him
and vacate the room.”154
However, the majority’s fanciful
approach to what the “demonstrated historical facts capable of
152

See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-50 (1984) (reasoning that the actions
of an agent of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation in arranging a search team based
on a grid-mapping system, which demonstrated the predicted course of searching, which
would inevitably have uncovered the evidence in the case); United States v. Boatwright,
822 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing the unlawful search and seizure of evidence by
police officers without a warrant); United States v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir.
1985) (analyzing the actions of an FBI agent searching an arrested suspect’s motel room).
153
See Brian Forst, The Privatization and Civilianization of Policing, in 2 BOUNDARY
CHANGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE ORGANIZATIONS 21 (2000) (“Policing is widely regarded as an
exclusively public-sector activity conducted by sworn officers, but a large and increasing
share of the aggregate demand for public safety and security is being handled by the
private sector and by civilians. As recently as 1965, there were more sworn police officers
than private security personnel and vastly more sworn officers than civilians — the number
of sworn officers surpassed the number of full-time civilians employed by law enforcement
agencies by 8.3 to 1 . . . . Within 30 years, the number of private security personnel soared
to about triple the number of sworn officers, while the ratio of sworn officers to full-time
civilians in law enforcement agencies had declined similarly by a factor of 3, to 2.6 to 1.”).
154
Young, 573 F.3d at 722.
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ready determination”155 would produce did not rebut the dissent’s
argument that, since SFPD Officer Koniaris had arrested Young
based upon probable cause that he was a felon in possession of a
firearm, Young therefore would not likely have had an opportunity
to recover the gun before it was lawfully seized by the police.156
The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the introduction of
illegally obtained evidence if the government can show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the tainted evidence would
inevitably have been discovered through lawful means.157 The
doctrine requires that the fact or likelihood that makes the
discovery inevitable must arise from circumstances other than
those disclosed by the illegal search itself.158 Inevitable discovery
“involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated
historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.”159
As Justice Breyer explained in his dissenting opinion in Hudson v.
Michigan:160
[The inevitable discovery] rule does not refer to discovery that
would have taken place if the police behavior in question had
(contrary to fact) been lawful. The doctrine does not treat as
critical what hypothetically could have happened had the police
acted lawfully in the first place. Rather, “independent” or
“inevitable” discovery refers to discovery that did occur or that
would have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of)
the unlawful behavior and (2) independently of that unlawful
behavior.
The government cannot, for example, avoid
suppression of evidence seized without a warrant (or pursuant
to a defective warrant) simply by showing that it could have
obtained a valid warrant had it sought one. Instead, it must
show that the same evidence “inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means.” “What a man could do is not at all
the same as what he would do.”161
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Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
See Young, 573 F.3d at 726-27.
157
United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444).
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Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1396 (citing United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d
862, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
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Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (5-4 decision, with Breyer, J., dissenting
and joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.).
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Hudson, 547 U.S at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Nix,
467 U.S. at 444 and adding emphasis, and quoting J.L. Austin, Ifs and Cans, 42 PROC.
BRIT. ACAD. 109, 111-12 (1956)).
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The question then becomes whether the private actors’ policy, the
Hilton SPI, would have led to lawful discovery despite the officer’s
unlawful search and seizure. The answer here is “no.”
Despite the dissent’s insistence that “no reasonable
sequence of events” would have resulted in Young returning to his
hotel room for the gun, the government did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the gun would have been
inevitably discovered. The Hilton security officers were so
concerned with complying with Hilton Hotel’s policies that it was
equally likely that, instead of the police officer automatically
obtaining possession of the evidence by lawful means, the
security officers would have demanded a search warrant issued
by a magistrate before relinquishing the gun. As stated in United
States v. Mejia,162 the Ninth Circuit has never applied the
inevitable discovery doctrine so as to excuse the failure to obtain a
search warrant where the police had probable cause but simply
did not attempt to seek a warrant from a magistrate.163
The government did not overcome the speculation prohibited
in Nix because it failed to foreclose the possibility that SFPD
Officer Koniaris might have been unable to obtain possession of
the gun by any method other than a warrant.164 As Justice Breyer
explained in Hudson,
The question is not what police might have done had they not
behaved unlawfully. The question is what they did do. Was
there set in motion an independent chain of events that would
have inevitably led to the discovery and seizure of the evidence
despite, and independent of, that behavior?165

In Young, there was no independent chain of events set in
motion that would have resulted in the inevitable discovery of the
gun. Although the dissent may be correct in pointing out that
Young’s most likely next destination was the police station, the
government simply did not meet its burden of showing inevitable
discovery by a preponderance of the evidence because there
were multiple possible outcomes at the moment of SFPD Officer
Koniaris’s unlawful activity.
B.

YOUNG LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN FOR AN EXCESSIVE EXPANSION
162

United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id.
164
See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
165
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
163
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This case highlights the importance of the warrant
requirement and strict adherence to the mandate of the Fourth
Amendment. Private security agents do not need a warrant to
conduct a private search on private property. Permitting a police
officer to exploit a private search in order to seize evidence for use
in a criminal prosecution is a dangerous maneuver around the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from such unreasonable
searches and seizures.166
Relying upon the diligence and investigative tools of private
security agents would considerably broaden the ability of the
government to access otherwise unavailable evidence, while at
the same time avoiding the constraints of the Fourth Amendment
by limiting the “state action” required to invoke constitutional
limitations. By relying so heavily on the written and unwritten
policies of Hilton’s private security officers, the Young dissent
encourages over-reaching by private actors and by the police.
This directly conflicts with the purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
which itself was a response to warrantless intrusions by British
officers.167
Although the inevitability of lawful discovery need not be
established by clear and convincing evidence – a standard of
proof that would have been imposed by the dissent in Nix v.
Williams – the government nonetheless bears the burden of
proving the likelihood that the evidence would have been
inevitably discovered.168 While a recommendation of the use of a
higher standard is beyond the scope of this Note, it is as crucial a
time as ever to reflect on the purpose of the inevitable discovery
doctrine and the ramifications of broadening its applicability.
Based on the likelihood of increased use of private police in
American law enforcement, Fourth Amendment analysis –
166

See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (explaining that “a wrongful
search or seizure conducted by a private party does not violate the Fourth Amendment and
that such private wrongdoing does not deprive the government of the right to use evidence
that it has acquired lawfully”).
167
Heather Winter, Resurrecting the “Dead Hand” of the Common Law Rule of 1789:
Why Terry v. Ohio is in Jeopardy, 42 NO. 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 5-7 (2006) (citing United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) (explaining that the framing of the Fourth
Amendment occurred in response to the American colonists’ experiences with the British
writs of assistance)).
168
See Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I would require clear and
convincing evidence before concluding that the government had met its burden of proof on
this issue.”).
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particularly that involving the inevitable discovery doctrine – must
focus on the applicable burden of proof. The standard for
establishing the inevitable discovery doctrine as an exception to
the exclusionary rule is preponderance-of-the-evidence.169 Only
through strict adherence to this standard will the constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures be likely
to endure for another two centuries.170
The government failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the gun seized by SFPD Officer Koniaris would
have been discovered by lawful means unconnected to the
officer’s unlawful infringement of Young’s Fourth Amendment
right. At the moment of SFPD Officer Koniaris’s unlawful intrusion
into Young’s hotel room, the demonstrated historical facts
indicated his suspicion that Young was a felon in possession of a
firearm. Young was detained in the Hilton Hotel security office,
and when SFPD Officer Koniaris began searching Young’s hotel
room, it was not inevitable that his gun would have been
discovered by lawful means. The Hilton security guards could
have demanded a warrant before turning over their guest’s private
belongings to the police officer. Equally likely, Young could have
been booked into the local jail and released on bail, after which he
could have returned to the hotel for his belongings, including his
gun. Also plausible is that Young’s acquaintance, with whom he
had returned to the hotel on the night of his arrest, could have
entered Young’s hotel room after the police left the premises and
removed the gun.
The facts as they stood just before SFPD Officer Koniaris
violated Young’s Fourth Amendment right did not even suggest
that the gun would likely have been discovered by lawful means,
as required under Nix for inevitable discovery to apply.171
Regardless of Young’s next destination, neither SFPD Officer
Koniaris’s failure to secure a search warrant, nor the facts as they
stood just before the unlawful police conduct took place,
supported an application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

169

See id. at 444 (majority opinion) (“If the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have
been discovered by lawful means . . . then . . . the evidence should be received.”).
170
The Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, was ratified on December 15,
1791.
171
See People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 79 (Cal. 2004) (explaining that the inevitable
discovery doctrine “recognizes that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means,
then the exclusionary rule will not apply”) (citing Nix, 467 U.S. 431).
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Expanding inevitable discovery to apply to such cases would be
contrary to Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent and would
jeopardize the privacy protections guaranteed to all Americans by
the United States Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit properly affirmed the suppression of
evidence of the gun found in Young’s hotel room. However, the
Young majority should have engaged in a more thorough analysis
of the issue of inevitable discovery. If law enforcement is allowed
to hide behind, and at the same time benefit from, a search by
private actors, the government’s access to otherwise illegally
obtained evidence will grow exponentially. The use of the
inevitable discovery doctrine to admit such evidence against a
criminal defendant is precisely the kind of result that the Fourth
Amendment and the exclusionary rule were designed to prevent.
Instead, Young has left the door open for those who seek to
dramatically expand the inevitable discovery doctrine, a result that
could swallow the exclusionary rule and undermine the important
privacy rights that the Fourth Amendment was written to protect.
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